Consequentialism and Free Will
作者: Maria SvedbergTorbjörn Tännsjö
刊名: The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 2017, Vol.24 , pp.23-41
来源数据库: Philosophy Documentation Center
DOI: 10.5840/harvardreview2017558
原始语种摘要: Many moral theories incorporate the idea that when an action is wrong, it is wrong because that there was something else that the agent could and should have done instead. Most notable among these are consequentialist theories. According to consequentialism an action A is wrong if and only if there was another action B that the agent could have performed such that, if the agent had performed B instead of A, the consequences would have been better. Relatively little attention has been given to the question of how to understand the meaning of ‘could have’ in this specific context. However, without an answer to this question, consequentialist theories fail to yield determinate verdicts about the deontic status of actions in real scenarios. It is here argued that the following conditional...
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  • actions 对策
  • wrong 错误的
  • there 那里
  • meaning 意义
  • universally 普遍地
  • something 稍微
  • question 问题
  • notable 值得注意的
  • answer 答复
  • conditional 有条件的