Real Agency
作者: John Heil
刊名: The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 2017, Vol.24 , pp.9-22
来源数据库: Philosophy Documentation Center
DOI: 10.5840/harvardreview201761210
原始语种摘要: Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument makes salient the difficulties facing attempts to reconcile determinism and agency. Others go further. Derk Pereboom, for instance, contends that science provides compelling evidence that no action is free, and Galen Strawson argues that conditions for genuinely free action are flatly unsatisfiable. Against such skepticism about free will, the paper introduces considerations in support of the idea that there are probably good reasons to think that conditions for free actions—real agency—are sometimes satisfied, that ascriptions of agency are sometimes true, but that truthmakers for these ascriptions could be wholly deterministic in a way that might seem to, but does not in fact, place them at odds with the possibility of genuinely free action.
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  • agency 代办处
  • deterministic 确定性
  • action 行为
  • skepticism 怀疑主义
  • reconcile 调合
  • wholly 完全
  • sometimes 有时
  • evidence 
  • instance 例子
  • conditions 条件式