Duopolistic competition under risk aversion and uncertainty
作者: Michail ChronopoulosBert De ReyckAfzal Siddiqui
作者单位: 1Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
2Department of Management Science and Innovation, University College London, London, UK
3Department of Statistical Science, University College London, London, UK
4Department of Computer and Systems Sciences, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
刊名: European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, Vol.236 (2), pp.643-656
来源数据库: Elsevier Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.01.018
关键词: Investment analysisReal optionsCompetitionRisk aversion
英文摘要: Abstract(#br)A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk aversion increase. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here, we examine these two opposing effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a firm and its entry decision behave differently with risk aversion and uncertainty depending on the type of competition. Interestingly, if the leader’s role is defined endogenously, then higher uncertainty makes her relatively better off, whereas with the roles exogenously defined, the impact of uncertainty is ambiguous.
全文获取路径: Elsevier  (合作)
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影响因子:2.038 (2012)

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