Coalition formation with dynamically changing externalities
作者: Youcef SklabSamir AknineOnn ShehoryAbdelkamel Tari
作者单位: 1Laboratoire d’Informatique Médicale, Faculté des Sciences Exactes, Université de Bejaia, 06000 Bejaia, Algérie
2IRD, Sorbonne Université, UMMISCO, F-93143, Bondy, France
3LIRIS Laboratory, Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1, Lyon, France
4Bar Ilan University, Israel
刊名: Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 2020, Vol.91
来源数据库: Elsevier Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.engappai.2020.103577
关键词: Coalition formationCoalitions externalitiesDynamically changing externalitiesTask dependenciesMulti-agent negotiation
原始语种摘要: Abstract(#br)We consider multiple self-interested bounded-rational agents each of which has a goal it needs to achieve. Goals are achievable by executing a set of interdependent tasks. Some tasks exhibit time dependencies and may require sequential execution. For each agent, there may be several alternative sets of tasks that can achieve the goal. Execution of alternatives, may be more beneficial when done by a group of agents and not by a single agent. To jointly achieve goals, agents may form interdependent coalitions. Such coalition formation is computationally intractable. We nevertheless seek a practical solution that is not necessarily optimal yet acceptable by the agents. A solution where agents examine only coalitions in which they are members is inapplicable, as externalities are...
全文获取路径: Elsevier  (合作)

  • externalities 外部效应
  • interdependent 互相依存
  • formation 建造
  • problem 题目
  • alternatives 代替案
  • expected 预期
  • optimal 最佳的
  • coalition 联合
  • achieve 达到
  • bounded 有界的