Reporting incentives, ownership concentration by the largest outside shareholder, and reported goodwill impairment losses
作者: Jamaliah Abdul Majid
作者单位: 1School of Accountancy, College of Business, Universiti Utara Malaysia, 06010 Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia
刊名: Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 2015, Vol.11 (3), pp.199-214
来源数据库: Elsevier Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcae.2015.07.002
关键词: Largest outside shareholderGoodwill impairmentAccounting discretionOwnership concentrationEmerging economyMandatory accounting change
原始语种摘要: Abstract(#br)This paper examines the determinants of reported goodwill impairment losses by Malaysian listed companies from 2006 to 2010. The results show managers' reporting incentives are significantly associated with the reported impairment losses. The results also show that the effect of “big bath” reporting on the reported impairment losses was moderated by the largest outside shareholder ownership concentration. Further analyses reveal that “big bath” reporting is not found in companies with a controlling outside shareholder. These findings suggest that increased ownership by the largest outside shareholder is associated with increased shareholder monitoring of the managers' “big bath” reporting.
全文获取路径: Elsevier  (合作)