Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction and Sales Promotion in Dyadic Supply Chain in Presence of Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness
作者: Liangjie XiaLongfei HeXiaolin Xu
作者单位: 1School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
2College of Management & Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
刊名: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2014, Vol.2014
来源数据库: Hindawi Journal
DOI: 10.1155/2014/837376
原始语种摘要: The paper studies how the combination of the manufacturer’s carbon emission reduction and the retailer’s emission reduction relevant promotion impacts the performances of a dyadic supply chain in low-carbon environment. We consider three typical scenarios, that is, centralized and decentralized without or with side-payment. We compare measures of supply chain performances, such as profitabilities, emission reduction efficiencies, and effectiveness, in these scenarios. To improve chain-wide performances, a new side-payment contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and numerical experiments are also conducted. We find the following. (1) In decentralized setting, the retailer will provide emission cutting allowance to the manufacturer only if their unit product profit margin is...
全文获取路径: Hindawi  (合作)

  • retailer 零售商业企业
  • decentralized 分散
  • rationality 有理性
  • supply 供给
  • manufacturer 制造者
  • pooling 并批
  • Analysis 分析
  • dyadic 二重的
  • successfully 成功地
  • reduction 减少