Access pricing with regulated downstream competition and upstream externalities
作者: Kristin LinnerudSteinar Vagstad
刊名: European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2010, Vol.37 (1), pp.77-96
来源数据库: Oxford University Press
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbp045
关键词: agricultural marketscooperativesregulationaccess pricing
原始语种摘要: We examine the optimal funding of farmers who have organised their activity in a cooperative that controls the supply of an input factor and meets competition in the market for its processed product. Since the rival's cost is private information, it may earn a rent. We show that the optimal price on the input factor – the access price – discriminates against the rival because rent is more valuable in the cooperative, and the regulator, therefore, sacrifices some cost efficiency in order to shift rents. The result is derived in a simplified context, but applies to contexts with more participants and products.
全文获取路径: Oxford U Press 

  • externalities 外部效应
  • competition 竞争
  • pricing 定价
  • optimal 最佳的
  • rival 竞争
  • price 价格
  • market 市场
  • products 制品
  • supply 供给
  • information 报告