Skin in the game? Experimental reactions to prospective reputational damage by corporate personnel
作者: Jesus Jimenez-AndradeTimothy Fogarty
刊名: Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review, 2019, Vol.3 (2)
来源数据库: Virtus Interpress Publishing House
DOI: 10.22495/cgsrv3i2p6
关键词: Executives’ AttitudesExecutives’ CompensationsReputational ThreatsEquity-Based CompensationsInternal Auditors
原始语种摘要: All organizations confront the possibility of scandal; however, the reputational threat caused by scandal is exacerbated when these events are not properly addressed. Since scandals also have the potential to adversely affect organizational personnel, dilemmas arise regarding traditional ideas of employee agency. In this study, we conduct an experiment manipulating the severity of the reputational threat and its financial consequences for decision-makers, using actual corporate officers and internal auditors. One key question is this: “Are corporate decision-makers’ responses to potential scandals affected by whether they, as incentivized individuals (via stock options), have “skin in the game?” Findings indicate that corporate personnel believe corporations should respond aggressively to...
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  • corporate 法人的
  • personnel 全体人员
  • decision 决定
  • Equity 衡平法
  • expected 预期
  • equity 衡平法
  • options 保留购买权
  • stock 岩株
  • agency 代办处
  • potential