Foresight in a Game of Leadership
作者: Logan PerrySergey Gavrilets
作者单位: 1Department of Mathematics, Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, 37996, Knoxville, TN, USA
2Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, 37996, Knoxville, TN, USA
刊名: Scientific Reports, 2020, Vol.10 (1), pp.113-132
来源数据库: Springer Nature Journal
DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-57562-1
英文摘要: Abstract(#br)Leadership can be effective in promoting cooperation within a group, but as the saying goes “heavy is the head that wears the crown”. A lot of debate still surrounds exactly what motivates individuals to expend the effort necessary to lead their groupmates. Evolutionary game theoretic models represent individual’s thought processes by strategy update protocols. The most common of these are random mutation, individual learning, selective imitation, and myopic optimization. Recently we introduced a new strategy update protocol - foresight - which takes into account future payoffs, and how groupmates respond to one’s own strategies. Here we apply our approach to a new 2 × 2 game, where one player, a leader, ensures via inspection and punishment that the other player, a...
全文获取路径: Springer Nature  (合作)
影响因子:2.927 (2012)