The Shapley value in the Knaster gain game
作者: Federica BriataAndrea Dall’AglioMarco Dall’AglioVito Fragnelli
作者单位: 1University of Genova
2Sapienza University of Rome
3LUISS University
4University of Eastern Piedmont
刊名: Annals of Operations Research, 2017, Vol.259 (1-2), pp.1-19
来源数据库: Springer Nature Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-017-2651-8
关键词: Shapley valueKnaster procedureCollusion
原始语种摘要: In Briata et al. (AUCO Czech Econ Rev 6:199–208, 2012 ), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by Knaster (Ann Soc Pol Math 19:228–230, 1946 ). In this paper we analyze the Shapley value (Shapley, in: Kuhn, Tucker (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II (Annals of Mathematics Studies 28), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953 ) of the game and propose its use as a measure of the players’ attitude towards collusion. Furthermore, we relate the sign of the Shapley value with the ranking order of the players’ evaluation, and show that some players in a given ranking will always deter collusion. Finally, we characterize the...
全文获取路径: Springer Nature  (合作)
影响因子:1.029 (2012)

  • collusion 通谋
  • averse 嫌恶的
  • value 
  • games 野味类
  • ranking 级别
  • division 
  • towards 朝向
  • coalition 联合
  • procedure 手续
  • always 总是