Cournot–Stackelberg games in competitive delocation
作者: Diego Ruiz-HernándezJavier ElizaldeDavid Delgado-Gómez
作者单位: 1University College for Financial Studies
2Universidad de Navarra
3Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
刊名: Annals of Operations Research, 2017, Vol.256 (1), pp.149-170
来源数据库: Springer Nature Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2288-z
关键词: Facility closingCompetitive delocationNash equilibriumCournotStackelbergCustomer loyalty
原始语种摘要: In order to mitigate the effects of the contraction in demand during economic crises, firms face the need to reduce the number of facilities in their networks. This reduction must be conducted taking into consideration both the possible actions of their rival firms and the reaction of the affected customers, so that the loss of market share is minimised. In this article, we analyse the facility closing problem of two firms operating in a duopolistic market. The problem is modelled as a non-cooperative game over a binary integer programming formulation of the firms’ delocation problem. The possible outcome of the game is analysed for three different competitive scenarios: Myopic behaviour, Cournot conjectures, and Stackelberg strategies. These scenarios are analysed under the assumption...
全文获取路径: Springer Nature  (合作)
影响因子:1.029 (2012)

  • competitive 竞争性的
  • games 野味类
  • equilibrium 平衡
  • problem 题目
  • closing 闭合
  • market 市场
  • loyalty 忠实
  • crises 危机
  • share 分配
  • scenarios 剧情