A new dataset on the political independence of fiscal monitoring institutions
财政监督机构政治独立性的新数据集
作者: Daniel Belling
作者单位: 1School of Politics and International Relations, Rutherford College, University of Kent, CT2 7NX, Canterbury, Kent, UK
刊名: European Political Science, 2020, Vol.19 (2), pp.122-139
来源数据库: Springer Nature Journal
DOI: 10.1057/s41304-019-00217-1
关键词: Independent Fiscal InstitutionFiscal monitoringPolitical independenceFiscal CouncilsFiscal contractFiscal policyNon-majoritarian institutions
英文摘要: Abstract(#br)This note introduces the Comparative Independent Fiscal Institutions Dataset which contains information on the institutional characteristics of forty-four independent expert bodies that are mandated to monitor fiscal policy and performance. Based on coding of legislative documents, it describes the institutional design of IFIs in mainly developed countries at different points in time. It comprises indicators and indices on formal political independence, expert proficiency and powers to intervene into the budget process. I report empirical variations between different models of IFIs such as Fiscal Councils and Parliamentary Budget Offices.
全文获取路径: Springer Nature  (合作)
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