2-player approximate Nash equilibrium
作者: Aviad Rubinstein
作者单位: Stanford University
英文丛书称: ACM Books
出版社: ACMMC,   2019
ISBN: 978-1-94728-723-9
来源数据库: Association for Computing Machinery
DOI: 10.1145/3241304.3241321
原始语种摘要: Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed.(#br)Understanding whether...
全文获取路径: ACM 

  • equilibrium 平衡
  • player 局中人
  • approximate 近似的
  • games 野味类
  • problem 题目
  • centralized 集中式
  • frontier 境界
  • hierarchy 分级
  • prove 实验
  • polynomial 多项式