Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?
作者: Jesper RüdigerAdrien Vigier
作者单位: 1Department of Business Administration, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (email: jrudiger@emp.uc3m.es )
2 Department of Economics, BI Norwegian Business School (email: a.h.vigier@gmail.com )
刊名: American Economic Review, 2020, Vol.110 (4), pp.1145-1176
来源数据库: American Economic Association
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170690
原始语种摘要: We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers’ gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic complementarity in information acquisition amongst market makers. We then derive the equilibrium pattern of information acquisition and examine the implications of our analysis for market liquidity and price discovery. We show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery. (JEL O82, O83, G14 )
全文获取路径: 美国经济学会 

  • liquidity 怜性
  • market 市场
  • information 报告
  • informed 消息灵通
  • equilibrium 平衡
  • price 价格
  • strategic 战略的
  • dealer 庄家
  • acquisition 捕获
  • discovery 发现